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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

IS THE AWARD OF DAMAGES ENTERED BY THE JURY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BELOW,

AND DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN REVERSING AND REMANDING THE CASE ON APPEAL FOR THE
TRIAL OF THIS ISSUE?

2.

WAS THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ERROR GIVEN THE

FACT THAT THERE WAS NO RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT BELOW MADE AND
PRESERVED BY REGIONAL?

3.

WAS THE REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ERROR GIVEN THE

FACT THAT THE PARTIES STIPULATED TO SUBMIT THE AMOUNT OF FEES TO THE SOUND DISCRETION
OF THE TRIAL COURT?

4.

WAS THE AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO AMEND

ITS PLEADINGS ERROR GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE MOTION TO AMEND WAS MADE SEVERAL MONTHS
BEFORE THE ACTUAL DATE WHEN THE TRIAL COMMENCED?

5.

WAS THE THE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY REGARDING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES PROPER

GIVEN THE FACT THAT IT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE?

6.

WAS THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BELOW BASED UPON EVIDENCE PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY?

SUMMARY OF THE OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
On November 24,1989, the Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion in the case of Regional Sales
Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct App. 19|89). The opinion was written by
Judge Billings. Although the parties, both as appellants and cross-appellants, argued several matters in
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their briefs and before the Court of Appeals, the opinion focused on three issues: (1) the calculation of
damages by the jury, assigning prejudicial error to an instruction selected and given by the trial court, (2)
the issue of the court!s reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the absence of a record, to include
findings of fact, and (3) the propriety of the court's denial of Mr* Reichert's motion to amend his counterclaim to include a claim of breach of contract by Regional Sales. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for a determination of damages consistent with the opinion, reversed and remanded on the issue
of attorney fees and affirmed on the denial of the Petitioner's motion to amend his counter-claim. The
Court of Appeals failed to consider the effect of the admission of Exhibit 10 by Regional on the issue of
damages, although Petitioner raised that issue before the Court of Appeals. A copy of the opinion of the
Court of Appeals is attached as Appendix A.
This Court should note that in each case where the trial court entered a discretionary ruling contrary
to the Regional's interests, that the Court of Appeals reversed and in the case where the trial court
exercised its discretion in favor of the interests of Petitioner, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Jurisdiction is laid in this Court pursuant to Rule 42, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Rule 43
specifies the standards under which the Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari should be granted (1) When a
decisions of one panel of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with the decisions of another panel of that
court, (2) when a decision of a panel of the Court of Appeals decided an issue of state or federal law which
is in conflict with a decision of this Court, (3) when a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a
decision that is so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for this
Court's powers of supervision, and (4) when the Court of Appeals has decided a matter of state, municipal
or federal law which should be decided by this Court. This petition rests upon claims that the Court of
Appeals violated the provision of subsections (2) and (3) as referenced above.
CONTROLLING PROVISION OF CONSTITUTIONS, ETC.
There are no determinative constitutional provisions.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

The case below involved the attempt by Regional to enforce a written contract entered into between
the parties in August of 1979, securing the services of Petitioner as Salesman, leading to potential future
ownership of Regional Sales by Petitioner. Regional Sales sought ti enforce a liquidated damages
provision based upon a covenant not to compete. The covenant not to compete involved a three year
prohibition restraining Mr. Reichert from selling for principals of Regional Sales Agency following
termination of his services under the contract (R. 2-4)
In order to recover, Regional Sales had to prove that the contract of 1979 was enforceable, that the
liquidated damages provision was not unlawful as a penalty, that the)covenant not to compete was
enforceable, that Mr. Reichert breached the agreement, and finally the calculation of damages in the event
of a breach. Since the verdict entered by the jury was a general verdict, it is not possible to determine the
basis upon which they decided each of these issues, or the extent of Regional Sales damages as calculated
by the jury. (R. 252)
Petitioner defended on the basis that the agreement of Augus^ 13,1979 was a sham which the
parties never intended to enforce. In 1977, the parties entered into ai^ oral agreement under which Mr.
Reichert would eventually own Regional Sales Agency. The contract of 1979 was represented to Mr.
Reichert as "window dressing" intended to satisfy the IRS in the event of an audit, that Mr. Reichert was
not an employee, but was an independent contractor. The concerns on the part of Regional Sales
regarding an audit by the IRS stemmed from the change in Regional Sales' status from a sole
proprietorship to a corporation in 1979. Through a belabored process of discovery in which Regional was
not totally cooperative, facts regarding a breach of the contract by Regional Sales prior to that of Mr.
Reichert finally came to light when Mrs. Helen Kiholm finally produced documents which had been
requested in 1985, and for which there was an order of the court granting Petitioner's motion to compel
the production of the same. These documents were produced virtually on the eve of the first trial
scheduled before Judge Russon, and this delay explains the perhaps untimely motion by Petitioner to
amend his counter-claim.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

On April 39,1987, Petitioner moved to amend his counter-claim to add a claim for damages due to a
breach of the contract of 1979 by Regional Sales. (R. 132) That motion was denied. (R. 149) The case
was originally to be tried before Judge Russon on May 1,1987. (R. 127) Due to the conduct of Mrs.
Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct of the bench, Judge Russon, in chambers with
counsel for Petitioner present, offered to recuse himself, and that offer was subsequently accepted by
Petitioner. (R. 149 — note that the entry in the record, rather than stating "Comes now counsel for the
defendant11, states " Comes now the Court, after discussions with counsel & grants defendant's motion for
recusal") Several months lapsedbefore the case was assigned to Judge Brian, who likewise denied
Petitioner's motion to amend the counter-claim, although the motion was been made on May 26,1987,
thus being a timely motion. (R. 160) The hearing on the motion to amend was continued until June 11,
1987, at which time it was denied. (R. 165,173-4) Trial before Judge Brian was set for September 14,
1987, which trial was continued until December 14,1987. (R. 170,175) The jury, on December 16,
1987, entered a general verdict for Regional, for "792.18, (Each party to bear their own legal fees)". (R.
252) Counsel for Regional objected to the failure to award fees, and thereafter filed a notice of hearing on
that issue on January 29,1988. (R. 331) That date and time were scheduled by counsel for Regional on
January 8th, 1988. (id-) There was no plenary hearing on the issue of attorney fees at that time, since
counsel for Regional failed to request the presence of a court reporter, and brought it on the trial court's
law and motion day. Therefore, Regional failed to preserve a record for review on appeal as to the
determination by the court of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. In fact, counsel for the parties
stipulated to the Court's determination of the amount and awarding of attorney fees to Regional, and on
appeal complained of having so done, insofar as counsel for Regional was concerned. (T. 246)
The case involved several attempts at discovery by Petitioner directed at locating and identifying
thousands of documents upon which the claims, counter-claims and defenses of the parties rested.
Regional failed to comply with requests for production of documents, and at one point counsel for
Petitioner was forced to resort to a motion to compel, which was made on March 25,1985 and granted on
4

April 23,1985. (R. 92,99) In fact, several of the documents upon which Petitioner based his motion to
amend the counter-claim were not produced by Regional until nearly the eve of trial, and therefore the facts
underlying the amendment were partially unknown prior to that time.
Although Regional claimed on appeal below that the parol evidence offered by Petitioner was
improperly used to influence the jury's calculation of damages, there is no direct evidence on such.
Furthermore, by admitting the ledger Exhibit P-10, Regional sought to impeach the parol evidence offered
by Mr. Reichert, and since this ledger was put together overnight during trial, Regional indicated that it
could indeed calculate damages, making the liquidated damages provision unenforceable. Regional
thereby consented to a trial of the issue of damages on the basis of Mr. Reichert's testimony, having
confronted the issues involved by offering Exhibit P-10.

STATEMENT Of MATERIAL FACTS
In September of 1977, the parties to this suit entered into an oral agreement, securing the services
of Mr. Rolland Reichert (Petitioner) as salesperson for Regional Sales Agency, which at that time was a
proprietorship owned by the Kiholms. (T. 8,128-132) Under the terms of that agreement, Mr. Reichert
could maintain, solicit and service his own sales accounts and principals, apart from those of Regional
Sales Agency (Respondent). (T. 33) In 1979, Regional Sales Agency incorporated itself as a Utah
corporation, and pursuant to the advice of its accountants, sought legal counsel to draft a new written
agreement between the parties. (Appendix B, T. 24) Paragraph "D" of that agreement lists specifically
those principals then represented by Regional Sales Agency. The terms of paragraph "B" authorized
Petitioner to sell those products handled by Regional corporation for the principals listed in paragraph "F"
(none are listed there but there is a list of them in paragraph "D") together with "any additional principals
which it may represent during the term of this agreement." (See appendix B) Paragraph K of that
agreement states that Petitioner is "free to dispose of such portion of his entire time, energy and skill
during regular business hours as he is not obligated to devote hereunder to Company in such manner as he
sees fit and to such persons, firms or corporations as he deems advisable." (Appendix B) Paragraph "L",
which is interpreted as a covenant not to compete, provides that Petitioner was restrained for a period of
5

three years following the termination of his "employment"fromrepresenting "any principal of Company
for the purpose of selling any of the Products." (Appendix B) Paragraph "L" further provides that "nor
will he with respect to the Products in any way ... solicit, divert or take away any Principal of Company
... Agent shall not... with respect to the Products, or any other products similar to the Products sell to,
divert, take away, solicit, or attempt to solicit, business or patronage from any of Company's customers,
accounts or any [other entity] in supply relationships with Company; And he shall not disclose
[confidential account or trade information]" ... Agent further agrees to pay Company its reasonable
attorney's fees and costs which are incurred as as a result of his breach of any provision herein." Of
utmost importance is the language of this paragraph relating to the measure of damages in the event of a
breach by Mr. Reichert: "In the event that Agent breaches the provisions of this paragraph, all proceeds
and benefits derived therefrom by Agent shall be received by him in trust for Company, and shall be paid
to Company upon demand by Company." Demand was never made by Regional.
Regional claims that in 1983 Mr. Reichert's services had fallen below the conduct required in the
contract of 1979, and terminated his services. (T. 16-17) In late 1983 and early 1984, Regional mailed
letters to several entities, all of whom it claims were its principals, informing them that Mr. Reichert had
been terminated effective December 31,1983 and that he would be replaced by a Mr. Jim Lord. (T. 56)
This letter was sent to Artfaire, Carousel Products and Atlas Textiles. (T. 56-59) The reactions of these
so-called Principals of Regional Sales is interesting. Artfaire, upon receipt of the letter, notified Regional
Sales that it considered Mr. Reichert to be their representative. A subsequent letter from Artfaire
terminated the arrangement between it and Regional Sales. Carousel Products reacted in a similar
fashion, as did Adas Textiles. (M-) Atlas Textiles terminated its relationship with Regional Sales on
January 5,1984, while Artfaire terminated Regional Sales on February 28,1984 and Carousel terminated
its relationship with Regional Sales in January, 1984. (MO
Testimony at trial also demonstrated the fact that, even if Artfaire had been a principal of Regional
Sales on December 31, 1983, was not as of February 28, of 1984. Mr. Dennis Nelson, Western regional
Sales Manager for Artfaire testified that he set up an appointment for an interview with Petitioner and
subsequently selected him as Artfaire's representative in Utah. (T. 112-114) A contract was sent to
6

Regional Sales, and was signed by Helen Kiholm. Artfaire didnft want the signature of Mrs. Kiholm as
they had never had any dealings with her, and subsequently returned the contract for Mr. Reichert's
signature. (M.) IN the fall of 1983, Mr. Nelson was contacted by Mr. Kiholm, who inquired about the
performance of Petitioner as their sales representative. Mr. Nelson indicated that he was satisfied with Mr.
Reichert1 s performance. (T. 115) In December of 1983, Mr. Kiholm called Mr. Nelson again and
informed him that "Mr. Reichert was no longer with him as a partner in his business" and that Regional
Sales would bring in a Mr. Lord. (T. 116-117) Mr. Nelson further replied that "I didn't know of any
instance where Mr. Kiholm was involved in the sale of Artfaire merchandise" and advised Mr. Kiholm that
he would be reviewing the representation of Artfaire in Utah. (T. 117) Mr. Nelson further states that he
had never worked with anyone but Mr. Reichert, and that he approached Mr. Reichert and offered him an
appointment as representative for Artfaire. (T. 117-119) Artfaire hired Mr. Reichert only after the
termination of the 60-day waiting period in the contract originally signed by Mr. Reichert, in February of
1984. (T. 120) Mr. Nelson was clear that Artfaire approached Mr. Reichert for the position as sales
representative, and not vice versa. (T. 120-121) There was no evidence tat Mr. Reichert was selling
competing lines following his termination, or that he disclosed any trade or account secrets. In short, the
entire claim for damages made out by Regional rested upon disputed evidence as to whether or not Mr.
Reichert wrongfully represented Artfaire, Adas Textiles and Carousel Product, and the assumption that
that representation violated the three year prohibition on so doing.
Accordingly, the jury was faced with the following issues of disputed fact: (1) Were Artfaire,
Atlas Textiles and Carousel Products Principals of Regional in 1983, and if so, for how long?, (2) If so,
did Mr. Reichert represent them while they were principals, and if so, for how long?, (3) Did Mr. Reichert
solicit, divert or take away any principal of Regional following his termination?, (4) did he violate the noncompete and divulgence of trade/account secrets provisoins of Paragraph "L"?, and (5) what is the
appropriate measure of damages for these violations, if any are found?
6(a)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING AND REMAINDING ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES
AS AWARDED BY THE JURY AT TRIAL.

The decision of the Court of Appeals to remand on the issue of calculation of damages is
improper in that it calls for the substitution of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for that of the
trial judge and the jury itself, without regard to well established legal precedent. The Court of
Appeals opines that rules of contract interpretation applied to the language of paragraph "L" of the
agreement result in a conclusion that the provisions of that paragraph are unambiguous. The Court
of Appeals states:
We find the relevant noncompetition and liquidated damage provisions unambiguously provide that
Mr. Reichert was not to represent any principal of Regional's for three years following his
termination.
(Reichert at 47-48) The Court of Appeals goes on to find that because of the validity of the
provisions of Pargraph "L" that the instruction of the trial court regarding the measure of damages
produced prejudicial error evidenced by the amount of damages actually awarded. The instruction
requested by Regional provided that it was entided to recover all commissions paid to Mr. Reichert
for Artfaire, Carousel and Adas Textiles for three years following his termination. In contrast, the
instruction of the court, which was actually given, provided for measuring damages by comparing
the actual damages to those claimed, and if the relation between actual and claimed damages in
reasonable, then the liquidated damages provision is enforceable. (Reichert at 48). This
instruction is in complete harmony with established law as set forth by this Court. In Madsen v.
Anderson, 667 P.2d 44 (Utah 1983) this Court established the rules governing the enforceability
of liquidated damages provisions:
As a general rule in Utah, parties to a contract may agree to liquidated damages in the case of a
breach, and such agreements are enforceable if the amount of liquidated damages agreed to us not
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained.
7

Madsen at -

iso Robbins v. Finlav. 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982); Johnson v. Carmen, 572

P.2d 371 (Utah 1977) and Perkins v. Spencer. 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952). It is
readily apparent that the instruction given by the trial court is a neai verbatim statement of the rule •
of law established by this Court, whereas the instruction requested is not. The instruction
requested does not apply the principles governing the law of enforceability of liquidated damages
provisions, and sis Midi is nupiopn

I he i\\ "it ol Appeal 'u»l mi' reversed and remanded based

upon a deficient instruction, but its decision fails to establish the rules of law set forth by this Court
and is in conflict with them. The Court of Appeals concluded that because the language of
paragraph "I•" is unambiguous, that Regional was entitled, as a matter of law, to all commissions
paid on sales from Artfaire, Carousel and Atlas textiles. Such reasoning avoids the legal tests
mentioned above, and obviates the need for the finder of fact to first determine whether or not
liquidated are a reasonable estimate of actual damages suffered. Accordingly, the instruction given
was a proper statement of the law a established by this Court and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is in conflict with ihe decisions of thr< Court
For the purposes of argument, Petitioner is willing to concede the points made by the Court
of Appeals as stated above. Under this concession, Petitioner would admit that Regional Sales
was entitled to $42,176.09 in commissions from the three claimed principals listed above.
However, the real test in reversing the award of damages made by the jury is to ascertain whether
or not there was a sound basis in evidei ice a nci pleadings foi their conclusion Such a basis can be
demonstrated by a review of available evidence and the pleadings before the court.
In his counter-claim, Mr. Reichert states in Paragraph 7 (R. 31) that Regional Sales was
required, to pay commissions of 40% of all sales except Skaggs from September 1,1979 to the date
of termination (December 31,1983), and that Regional Sales never intended to pay them. At trial,
evidence was offered that demonstrated that Regional Sales did not pay any of those commissions,
due and owing to Mr. Reichert. (T. 207, 213-214) This provided a basis for the jury to formulate
a valid offset against the damages claimed by Regional Sales.
8

Furthermore, Mrs. Kiholm admitted at trial that she had kept commissions which Mr.
Reichert had earned in 1983, as an offset to claimed damages without any intention of paying them
to him. The amount of those commissions was never specified. (T. 55-56) This was a proper
subject of offset against liquidate damages claimed by Regional Sales.
In short, the jury could have indeed found that the liquidated damages provision of the
contract was enforceable, and could have made an initial award of $42,176.09 to Regional Sales.
There was ample and proper evidence supportive of an offset under the counter-claim, of an
amount of money which the jury concluded was due and owing Mr. Reichert, leaving a net award
to Regional of some $700. The fact that Regional did not require the entry of a special verdict
detailing the calculations of the jury is not the fault of Petitioner. Had Regional done this, a proper
basis for concluding that the instruction of the court was prejudicial could be entertained.
However, Regional failed to preserve a record on this point and in fairness to Petitioner cannot
now complain of its own failures and deficiencies in this regard. The Court of Appeals
accordingly erred in concluding that the award of the jury was made under the confusing influence
of an improper instruction. The jury could have proceeded to calculate damages by awarding the
entire liquidated amount and still have concluded that there was a valid offset. This Court should
not forget that evidence supportive of an offset came not only from Mr. Reichert, butfromMrs.
Kiholm as well. The award of the jury likewise not the product of using parol evidence
improperly. The jury could have determined that any or all Artfaire, Carousel or Atlas Textiles
were not principals of Regional but os Mr. Reichert.
POINT H
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURTS AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS ERROR GIVEN THE FACT
THAT THERE WAS NO RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT BELOW MADE AND
PRESERVED BY REGIONAL.

On appeal, it is axiomatic that it is the duty and responsibility of the Appellant (Regional) to
marshall evidence in support of its claim, and the failure to preserve a record of such evidence is
fatal to all claims dependant upon it. Regional claimed that the trial court erred in "reducing" the
9

amount of attorney fees awarded. Regional was therefore under an obligation to present evidence
that supported this claim. The only evidence produced was that of Counsel's affidavit.
The jury bekm \\\ n<1< <1 M Ikes and >sis to i OOII >t 1 in lis general UTCIJU (Counsel for
Regional took exception to this, and brought a motion for his fees and costs on Judge Brian's law
and motion calendar. Since counsel for the parties had stipulated to the court's determination ot
fees and losts, Region il had i lie fig In lo except to the award of no fees and costs made by the jury.
There was therefore no recorder present and no record of the proceedings. Counsel for Regional
offered his affidavit of fees and costs, asking in excess of $26,000 Although their \ as no record
preserved, counsel for Petitioner asserted at that time that the affidavit was deficient in several
respects: (1) That the affidavit failed to separate those fees and costs claimed for brining the failed
injuitt lion sought by Kej'ioiul < J»lli.il ihe aliidavil hlrtl lo meel the tests of case law, including
that set forth in Dixie State Bank. (3) that the fees were very disproportionate when compared to
the amount actually recovered. The judge asked counsel for Petitionn whai \ icasonahl^ fee would
be, bin counsel v> as reluctant to answer that question directly, since in effect he would be deciding
the fees of opposing counsel in light of his duties to Petitioner. Nevertheless, Counsel for
Petitioner suggested thai ten in iin I lie uniHiiit >l pidjuniail

onlillu exressive and unreasonable.

Judge Brian thereafter entered the amount of $7,500, which is less than ten times the award of
judgment. Counsel for Petitioner, further placed the court on notice of the requirements of Dixie
State Bank at that Hint

Hit ninin »u for attorney fees was that of counsel for Regional, the motion

carried in the amount of $7,500 and counsel for Regional had the responsibility to preserve a
record and the formulation offindingsof fact supportive of the awani of fee

mtl lailnl lo do so.

It was improper loi ihi l ourt of Appeals to lay responsibility for these deficiencies at the feet of
the trial court, and to use such as the means of reversing a valid order of the court.
Counsel has the lesponsibilitv lo makr mil piesrnr i ice on! tor purposes of appeal. In
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials. 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977) this Court held that failure to
preserve a record for appeal was fatal to appellant's cause, for there A as nothing for the appellate
court 111 rr\ ie w In Powers, the Defendant below sought recusal of the judge involved, and made
10

its motion for recusal in private, preserving no record of the hearing on that motion. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals in appropriately addressed the propriety of the manner of securing relief elected
by the Defendant The Court of Appeals confused the lack of a record with the lack of an
explanation for the trial court's "reduction" of attorney fees:
Unfortunately, the trial court made no such finding. Because the trial court gave no explanation for
its reduction of attorney fees, we reverse the award and remand for the trial court to enter an
amount supported by the undisputed evidence or alternatively to makefindingsto support the
reduction consistent with the authority cited herein (incl. Martindale v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514
(Utah Ct. App. 1989))
Reichert at 50, emphasis added, citations omitted The trial court did make findings
regarding the "reduction" of attorney fees and did explain its actions, but counsel for Regional
failed to make and preserve a record of such. The burden for preserving the record on these
matters or entering findings was inappropriately laid at the feet of the trial court at the expense of
fairness and justice to the Petitioner.
The review of a claim for attorney fees must be based upon clear evidence of an abuse of
discretion. (Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, at 1110) Without the benefit of a clear record
on this matter, Petitioner fails to understand how a clear abuse of discretion could have been found
by the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is at variance with the
decision of this Court In First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Wright. 521 P.2d 563 (Utah
1974) this Court unequivocally held that "In the absence of a record, this Court assumes that it
supports the judgment." Wright at 566. Finally, the Court of Appeals cites the case of Martindale
v. Adams. 777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) in its opinion in Reichert.
In Martindale. the trial court reduced the amount of attorney fees requested, at a hearing
which counsel for the unsuccessful party did not even attend. There was a record preserved of the
hearing, at which the court reduced the fees requested withoutfindingthem unreasonable. The
Court of Appeals noted that the amount requested was "adequate and undisputed" and that the trial
court abused its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless the reduction was
warranted by one or more of the factors in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah
11

1988). In the case at bar, Petitioner and his counsel attended the hearing set by counsel for
Regional on law and motion day, and did in fact dispute the propriety of the fees requested, citing
Dixie State Bank .mil
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authority tor Petitioner's position I inloriunately, counsel for Regional

did not request a reporter and failed to preserve a record of those contentions, and in the absence of
such a record, the Court of Appeal had no choice but to sustain the award of fees. The fact that the
Coin t of appeals remanded in the absence of a record settingfortha clear abuse of discretion is
inconsistent with the decisions of this Court. Certiorari is therefpre warranted to avoid a serious
miscarriage of justice against Petitioner.

poiNTm
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO AMEND ITS
PLEADINGS "¥v AS ERROR AND NO'I IN HARMONS WTI H THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

The decisions of this Court clearly hold that amendments to pleading should be liberally
granted, in the absence of surprise and prejudice, in order to avoid offending justice based upon
technicalities or procedural rules and to afford parties a day in court together with an opportunity to
have their dispute settled on the merits of their cause or defense. The rules of procedure aimed at
allowance of amendment fnvoi amendment, ami place upon ihe panv opposing amendment the
burden of showing that allowing amendment would cause prejudice or surprise. This Court
iterated the principles underlying the liberal granting of leave to amend pleadings:
[Motions to amend pleadings] must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have regarding their dispute. What
they are entided to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When that is
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules require liberality to allow examination into and
settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to
have reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests.
Chem v. Rucker. 11 I lull ?d 2l).\ 381 P Af Hi. (1%,?) a! <>1; se^ also Williams v. State Farm
Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). The clear intent of the rules allowing amendment is to
(1) liberalize pleading and procedure to afford parties the privilege of presenting legitimate
contentions, (2) The other party is simply entitled to notice of the issues raised and an opportunity
12

to meet those issues. Petitioner does not argue that the attempt at amendment on the eve of trial
before Judge Russon may have been prejudicial to RegionaTs cause. Nevertheless, the disallowal
of the amendment by Judge Brian was clear error, given the fact that trial was then several months
away and such denial violated the letter and spirit of Rule 15, as interpreted in Cheny, and as
established by this Court. Finally, the Court of Appeals specifically disallowed the opportunity to
amend Petitioner's counter-claim on remand, even though there can be no claim of prejudice at this
late date, nearly three years after the first attempt to amend, and Petitioner should in all fairness be
allowed to present material issues supportive of a legitimate claim. Petitioner seeks the ruling of
this Court to vacate the ruling of the Court of Appeals with regard to Petitioner's amendment.
Should this Court decline to vacate the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding a re-trial of
damages, then Petitioner requests this Court to rule to allow Petitioner an opportunity to amend its
counter-claim so that an offset can be effectuated, in the interests of justice. Furthermore, this
Court should send a clear signal to the bench and bar alike, that liberal amendment should be
allowed, indeed should be favored, absent a clear showing of prejudice. To allow the new trial to
proceed in the absence of such an amendment would allow the liquidate damages provision of the
contract to function as a penalty, since Petitioner would pay for and Regional would be enriched
by, monies covering overhead and other expenses which Regional did not actually have to pay.
Responectfully submitted this i~2L day of January, 1990:

USER
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ri-R ITFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ ~ ^ d a y of January, 1990, to the following:

BRYCEE.ROE
FABIAN & CLENDENTN
215 South State Street 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
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assumed responsibility for
the infant's physical well-being by agreeing
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist
on examining the mother when she reported
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature
birth was likely or if so7 what precautions
ibould be taken to minimize the likelihood of
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the
infant after birth as having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved the
symptoms but would not alleviate the condition itself; defendant minimized the seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy and
Joanne; three of the ten children he had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant
could die from the disease and that the disease
was progressive; defendant could not himself
admit the infant into a hospital because he
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have
to call another physician or have the infant
admitted through an emergency room facility;
Ivy testified that defendant only told her to
watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color and respiration, without advising
her as to the degree of change which might
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or
Joanne that death could result from the
disease; and defendant left the infant in the
care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence which
would indicate that defendant should not have
been aware that a substantial risk existed.
However, the existence of conflicting evidence,
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury
verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 42425 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The jury has been
through the arduous task of listening to and
assessing the evidence presented in this most
difficult case, and I do not think that we
should appropriately substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury
believed he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he should
have known the risks. I do not find the evidence 'sufficiently inconclusive/ as do my
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would
conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that defendant should have
been aware that a substantial and unjustified
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant
of negligent homicide as a result.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
REGIONAL SALES AGENCt, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Crossv.
Roland W. REICHERT,
Defendant, Respondent, and CrossAppellant.
No. S80246-CA
FILED: November 24,1989
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Pat B. Brian
ATTORNEY^
Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
and Cross-Respondent
E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and
Greenwood. tpOPINION
BaLIN£S, Judge:
Regional Sales Agency, inc. ("Regional")
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it
S792.18 in damages as a result of crossappellant Roland Reichert's ("Mr. Reichert")
breach of a non-competition agreement with
Regional, his former employer. Regional also
appeals the trial court's reduction of its attorney fees which Regional claims were provided
for by the parties' written contract and reasonably incurred in prosecuting this action.
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's
denial of his attempt to amend his counterclaim to add a claim for unpaid commissions
and salary. We reverse and remand in part,
and affirm in part.
Since the late 1950s, Edward and Helen
Kiholm have operated a small family business
which acted as a manufacturer's representative
in designated territories of the mountain west.
The business earned commissions from its
principal manufacturers by selling their goods
to retailers.
In 1977, the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert as
an independent contractor to handle outside
sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the
Kiholms intended to retire in ten years with
Mr. Reichert taking over the business. Mr.
Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978
when the business was incorporated as Regional.
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written
employment contract with Regional. The
employment contract contains a non-
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competition clause restricting Mr. Reichert
from representing manufacturers represented
by Regional or competing with Regional'*
manufacturers for a three-year period after
the termination of his relationship with Regional. The contract also contains the following
damage and attorney fees provisions central to
ti&mppeib
In the event Agent breaches the
p r o v i s i o n s of this [noncompetition] paragraph, all proceeds and benefits derived therefrom
by Agent shall be received and held
by him in trust for Company, and
shall be paid to Company upon
demand by Company.
Agent further agrees to pay
Company its reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs which are incurred as
a result of his breach of any provision herein.
On April 30, 1987, the day before a nonjury trial was scheduled before Judge Leonard
H. Russon and more than three years after
Mr. Reichert's original answer and counterclaim had been filed, Mr. Reichert filed an
amendment to his counterclaim. In this amendment, Mr. Reichert claimed Regional owed
him commissions and salary from 1977
through 1983. Judge Russon struck the amendment. On May 26, 1987, after Judge Russon
had recused himself at Mr. Reichert's request,
and a mistrial had been granted, Mr. Reichert
filed a written motion to amend his counterclaim again asserting a claim for commissions
and wages. The motion was denied by Judge
Pat B.Brian.
At trial it was undisputed that after Mr.
Reichert left Regional in 1983, he continued to
represent three manufacturers whom he had
previously represented as a salesman for
Regional: Artfaire, Carousel Party Favors,
Inc., and Atlas Textiles. He received commissions of $42,176.09 from these manufacturers
in the three-year period after his relationship
with Regional ended.
In defense of his actions, Mr. Reichert
claimed the written agreement of August 13,
1979, was never intended to have any force or
effect. He insisted that Regional represented
that it was merely "window dressing1' to
protect Regional in case of a tax audit.
The }ury found the 1979 employment agreement was enforceable and neither party has
appealed this issue.1 However, the jury only
awarded Regional $792.18 in damages.
The parties stipulated that evidence supporting reasonable attorney fees as provided for
by the employment agreement would be submitted to the judge by affidavit following the
jury verdict. Counsel for Regional submitted a
lengthy affidavit detailing $26,740.50 in fees.
No opposing affidavit was submitted by Mr.

Reichert. The court, witnout giving any explanation, awarded Regional $7,500 in fees.
The issues we address in this appeal are: (1)
whether Regional should have a new trial on
the issue of damages; (2) whether the judge
abused his discretion in reducing Regional*!
attorney fees; and (3) whether the trial court
tntd vxv deoying Mi. Rekhm'% motion \ o
amend his counterclaim to add a claim for
unpaid commissions and salary.
L DAMAGES
Regional challenges the jury's damage
award claiming it is contrary to the unambiguous terms of the parties9 non-competition
agreement which provides a formula to calculate damages. Regional claims the inadequate
damage award is a result of the trial court
improperly instructing the jury on the issue of
damages.
The provisions of the 1979 agreement
dealing with damages at issue on appeal
provide:
At no time during the term of
this agreement, or within a period
of three years following the termination of Agent's employment shall
Agent [Reichert], for himself or in
behalf of any other person, firm,
partnership or corporation (other
than the Company [Regional!)
represent any Principal of company
for the purpose of selling any of
their products.
Because a breach of this provision will result in irreparable
damages which are difficult to
measure ... Company at its election
shall be entitled to an injunction
restraining Agent from breaching
the terms of this provision.
In the event Agent breaches the
provisions of this paragraph, all
proceeds and benefits derived therefrom from agent shall be received
and held by him in trust for
company, and shall be paid to
c o m p a n y u p o n d e m a n d by
company.
In the first instance, the determination of
whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec.,
IAS P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). If
the trial court finds the agreement unambiguous and interprets its meaning by examining
only the words of the agreement, this interpretation also presents a question of law. Kimball
v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah
1985). We thus "accord [the trial court's]
construction no particular weight, reviewing its
action under a correctness standard." Id. The
trial court's selection of jury instructions interpreting contractual language also presents a
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question of. law. "Therefore, we grant no
particular deference to the trial court's
ruling.9 Ramon v. Fan, 770 P.2d 131, 133
(Utah 1989).
'Where questions arise in the interpretation
of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is
within the document itself. It should be looked
it in its entirety and in accordance with its
purpose. All of its parts should be given effect
insofar as that is possible/ Big Cottonwood
Turner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d
1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also
Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Prods. Co., 614 P.2d
160,163 (Utah 1980).
We find the relevant non-competition and
liquidated damage provisions unambiguously
provide that Mr. Reichert was not to represent
any principal of RegionaTs for three years
following his termination. Mr. Reichert admitted at trial that during his tenure with Regional, the company represented Carousel Products, Atlas Textiles, and Artfaire, three of
RegionaTs former principals as defined by the
parties' contract. The agreement further provides that if Mr. Reichert does represent any
of RegionaTs principals, then he will hold all
commissions earned as a result of this prohibited representation in trust for Regional.
Regional relied on this contractual language
and introduced evidence that Mr. Reichert
collected $42,176.09 in commissions from
Carousel, Atlas, and Artfaire during the three
years following his termination.
Regional requested the following instruction
reflecting its theory that the contract provided
a formula for determining damages based on
these earnings in violation of the contract:
Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in
addition to any other damages it
may prove by a preponderance of
the evidence, all commissions received by defendant during the years
1984, 1985, and 1986 from Artfaire
Carousel Party Favors, Inc., and
Atlas Textiles.
This instruction was refused by the trial court.
The court substituted the following instruction
on damages:
Where the parties agree on a
method of establishing damages for
breach of contract, the agreement is
enforceable if it is designed to
provide fair compensation for the
breach, based upon a reasonable
relation to actual damages.
Regional claims the instruction given is
contrary to Utah law. In Young Electric Sign
Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d
162 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court
considered a liquidated damage provision in a
contract. The court reversed the trial court
which had required the plaintiff to prove
actual damages to validate the liquidated
UTAH

damage provision. The court stated:
[A]s a general rule, parties to «
contract may agree to liquidated
damages in the case of a breach,
and such agreements are enforceable if the amount of liquidated
damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the possible compensatory damages and does not constitute a forfeiture or a penalty.
Reasonable liquidated damages
provisions may reduce the cost of
litigation by obviating the expense
entailed in proving actual damages.
If a liquidated damages provision is
enforceable, a plaintiff need not
prove actual damages. The burden
is on the party who would avoid a
liquidated damages provision to
prove that no damages were suffered or that there is no reasonable
relationship between compensatory
and liquidated damages.
Id. at 164 (citations omitted); see also Robbins
v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623,627 (Utah 1982).
The instruction given by the trial court in
this case, in effect, put the burden on Regional to establish that the liquidated damages
provision of the agreement provided fair
compensation for Mr. Reichert's breach and
the resulting damages awarded were reasonably related to the actual damages suffered by
Regional. This is contrary to Utah law.
Even if the instruction could be read to put
the burden on Mr. Reichert to show no
damages were suffered or there was no reasonable relationship between the actual
damages Regional suffered and the $42,176.09
it would collect under the agreement, there
was insufficient evidence introduced below to
enable the jury to find either proposition. Mr.
Reichert did not establish that the $42,176.09
in commissions awarded under the liquidated
damage provision would be disproportionate
to the amount of damage Regional suffered by
its loss of commissions from three of its
former principals. On appeal, Mr. Reichert
does not point to any evidence offered below
to show that the liquidated damages provision
was unreasonable nor does he compare the
liquidated damages to the actual damages
suffered by Regional.2
We cannot say that a provision which
returns the commissions lost for a three-year
period as a result of the breach of a noncompetition agreement is unreasonable as a
matter of law. Although this liquidated
damages formula does not reflect expenses
incurred by Mr. Reichert in earning the commissions, it is limited to three years. RegionaTs loss of profits as a result of its permanent loss of three of its principals to Mr.'
Reichert could certainly have exceeded a threeyear period and thus the liquidated damages
REPORTS
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provided by application of the contractual
provision.
__
We believe the jury verdict was a result of
improper instruction and the admission of
evidence on the issue of commissions which
Mr. Reichert claimed were owing him. This
testimony was received over objection and the
trial court limited its application to the issue
of the enforceability of the 1979 agreement.
Nevertheless, this evidence undoubtedly
further confused the jury. This evidence on
unpaid commissions would be inadmissible on
retrial on the limited issue of damages under
the contractual damages provision.
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse and
remand for a new trial on the issue of
damages consistent with the legal principles
stated herein.
n . ATTORNEY FEES
In Utah, litigants can recover attorney fees
only if they are authorized by statute or provided for by contract. Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citing
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d
730, 734 (Utah 1985); Turtle Management,
Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d
667, 671 (Utah 1982)); see Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-56 (1987). Moreover, *[i]f provided
for by contract, the award of attorney fees is
allowed only in accordance with the terms of
the contract/ Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at
988 (citing Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856,
858 (Utah 1984)); see also Turtle Management,
Inc., 645 P.2d at 671; LAM
Corp. v.
Loader, 688 P 2d 448,450 (Utah 1984).
In the present case, the contract of the
parties provides:
Agent [Reichert] ... agrees to pay
Company [Regional] its reasonable
attorney's fees and costs which are
incurred as a result of his breach of
any provision herein.
The parties stipulated at trial that, if the
jury found for Regional on {the enforceability
of the contract, the court would determine the
appropriate award of attorney fees. Following
trial, counsel for Regional submitted an affidavit supporting his fees detailed by a computer accounting of the hours worked and tasks
accomplished on RegionaTs behalf. Regional
claimed it had incurred a total of $26,740.50
in attorney fees and costs of S610.46. Counsel
for Regional also testified that the fees were
reasonable considering the nature and extent
of the work performed. Mr. Reichert made no
objection to the affidavit nor did he offer
opposing testimony on the issue of reasonable
attorney fees. The court made no findings of
fact nor conclusions of law on the issue of
attorney fees but simply entered an order
awarding $7,500 in fees to Regional.
It is generally within the trial court's discretion to determine the reasonable attorney
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fees which should be awarded and we will not
overturn the award absent an abuse of discretion. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988;
Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah
1984); Turtle Management, Inc., 643 P.2d at
671. We 'will presume that the discretion of
the trial court was properly exercised unless
the record dearly shows the contrary." Ooddard
v. Hickman,
685 P.2d 530, 534-35
(Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rd Road
Comm'n v. General OH Co., 22 Utah 2d 60,
62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968)). See also
Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). However,
where parties to a contract agree that attorney
fees will be awarded, those attorney fees provisions should ordinarily be enforced by the
court. Cobabe v. Crawford, 117 Utah Adv..
Rep. 26,27 (Ct. App. 1989).
An award of attorney fees must be based on
evidence in the record which supports the
award. See Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d
100, 103 (Utah 1983). However, a trial court is
not compelled to accept the self-serving testimony of a party requesting attorney fees
even if there is no opposing testimony. See
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524
(Utah 1978). A court can evaluate the fees
requested and determine a lesser amount is
reasonable under the circumstances. See Dixie
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989. Several practical
factors to consider in determining a reasonable
attorney fee are
the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on
the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the
case and the result attained, and the
expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.,
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah
1985); see also Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at
989.
We have consistently encouraged trial courts
to make findings to explain the factors which
they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award. See, e.g., Cabrera, 694 P.2d
at 624. Findings are particularly important
when the evidence on attorney fees is in
dispute or the trial court has reduced the attorney fees from those requested and supported
by undisputed evidence. Id.
We have recently held that a trial court
abuses its discretion in awarding less than the
amount of attorney fees requested when there
is adequate and uncontroverted evidence in the
record to support those fees unless the court
offers an explanation for the reduction considering the factors previously discussed. See
Martindale v. Adams, HI P.2d 514, 518
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Dixie State
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Ban*, 764 P.2d at 987-91.
In this case, the trial court substantially
reduced the attorney fees requested from
S26.740.S0 to $7,500 even though the record
contained undisputed testimony delineating the
services performed and that the rate and time
expended were reasonable and necessary. The
trial court made no findings or explanation for
its sua sponte reduction.
Mr. Reichert argues that the court's reduction of fees was proper because the fees were
incurred as a result of Regional'* unsuccessful
attempt to secure an inunction. Unfortunately, the trial court made no such finding.
Because the trial court gave no explanation for
its reduction of attorney fees, we reverse the
award and remand for the trial court to enter
the amount supported by the undisputed evidence or alternatively to make findings to
support the reduction consistent with the
authority cited herein.
BL DENIAL OF MR. REICHERT'S
MOTION TO AMEND
On April 30, 1987, three years after commencement of the litigation and following
extensive discovery, Mr. Rdchert filed an
"Amendment to Counterclaim" seeking judgment against Regional for "all commissions,
compensation, wages and salary found to be
due and owing" for the years 1977 through
1983. A non-jury trial was scheduled for the
next day. The trial court struck the attempted
amendment. After the trial commenced, Mr.
Reichert moved to recuse the assigned trial
judge. Judge Russon declared a mistrial and
the case was reassigned to Judge Brian who
denied a subsequent, identical motion to
amend filed by Mr. Reichert. The propriety of
the trial court's denial of Mr. Reichert's
amendment must be measured against Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), which states:
A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course any time
before a responsive pleading is
permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar
... otherwise, a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires....
The decision to allow an amendment is
discretionary with the trial court as part of its
duty to manage proceedings below. We will
not disturb a trial court's decision absent an
abuse of discretion. See Girard v. Appleby,
660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Chadwick v.
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah a . App.
1988); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
In analyzing the grant or denial of a motion
to amend, Utah courts have focused on three
factors: the timeliness of the motion; the jus-
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tification given by the movant for the delay;
and the resulting prejudice to the responding
party. See Tripp, 746 P.2d at 797.
Appellate courts have upheld a trial court's
denial of a motion to amend where the amendment is sought late in the course of the litigation, where there is no adequate explanation for the delay, and where the movant was
aware of the facts underlying the proposed
it long before its filing. Imperial
Enter., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 533 F.2d
287, 293 (5th Or. 1976); Girard, 660 P.2d at
248; Westlcy v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d
93,94 (Utah 1983).
Rule 13(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure focuses on the moving party's responsibility to articulate reasons for the delay:
"When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, or when justice requires, he may by
leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment." Without such justification,
[t]he amendment of pleadings on
the eve of trial causes great disruption to the legal process and is
unfair to an opponent who has
conducted discovery, fully prepared
the case, and scheduled trial time
based on the moving party's prior
pleadings.
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 820.
Courts have also found it important when
denying a motion to amend that new causes of
action or issues are added with consequent
disadvantage to the responding party. Girard,
660P.2dat248.
In his brief, Mr. Reichert alleges the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
his amendment because the issues presented
did not substantially vary the issues and evidence already involved in the case. We disagree. The issues raised by RegionaTs complaint were limited to the validity of the parties'
contract, particularly its non-competition
clause and Mr. Reichert's alleged breach of
the non-competition clause. The counterclaim interjected the issue of commissions due
and paid to Mr. Reichert for a six-year
period involving an analysis and accounting of
salesfiguresnot previously at issue.
Mr. Reichert made his first attempt to
amend his counterclaim on the day before the
trial was scheduled to commence and more
than three years after his original answer was
filed. Mr. Reichert offered no justification for
his delay in asserting his claim for unpaid
commissions.3
Thus, Mr/ Reichert, on the eve of trial,
attempted to insert new issues in the case
without giving any adequate explanation for
his delay. We believe this amendment would
have prejudiced Regional. On the facts before
us and under the authority previously discussed, we find the trial court did not abuse its
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ATTORNEYS:
In fummary, we reverie and remand on the Bhice J. Wilson, Provo, for Petitioner
issue of damages and attorney fees, but affirm Richard Sumaion, Salt Lake City, for
the trial court's denial of Mr. Rdchert's
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
attempt to amend his counterclaim.
Erie
V. Boorman Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
WE CONCUR:
Before Judges Billings, Oarff and Greenwood.
Russell. W. Bench, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
OPINION

1. In its brief. Regional complains about several
[spues being submitted to the jury and the court's
decision not .to direct a verdict. Specifically, Regional claims (1) there was insufficient evidence to
submit to the jury the question of whether the 1979
agreement was intended to have legal effect, and (2)
the court should have directed a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff on the issue of liability. However, since
the jury decided the issue of enforceability of the'
contract in Regional'* favor, we do not consider
these arguments. Whatever error may have occurred
was harmless.
2. The only evidence alluded to by Mr. Reichert is
evidence establishing certain unpaid commissions.
This evidence was not admitted on the issue of
damages but was specifically restricted to the issue
of the enforceability of the 1979 contract, and is
legally irrelevant to the damages provision at issue.
3. Later in the proceedings, Mr. Reichert again tried
to add his claim for unpaid commissions by filing a
Motion to Amend his counterclaim. This motion,
also made without justification, violated Utah Code
Ann. §78-7-19 (1989), which provides:
If an application for an order, made to
a judge of a court in which the action or
proceeding is pending, is refused in.
whole or in part, or is granted conditionally, no subsequent application for
the same order can be made to any
other judge....
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Steve ZIMMERMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah,
Granite Beef, Inc. and/or Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah and Employers'
Reinsurance Fund,
Respondents.
No. 890191-CA
FILED: November 28, 1989
Original Proceeding in this Court

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Stephen P. Zimmerman appeals an Industrial Commission order which denied him permanent disability benefits. We affirm.
In January 1987, Zimmerman was employed
by Granite Beef, Inc. His duties consisted of
cutting and boxing meat, requiring him to lift
heavy boxes and pallets. On January 26, 1987,
Zimmerman, while lifting an empty pallet,
heard a pop in his low back and felt an
immediate sharp pain. He reported the incident to his supervisor and left work to obtain
medical attention. At the time of the accident,
Zimmerman was twenty-two years of age. He
had worked as a laborer since age seventeen
and had never complained of back problems
prior to the accident. X-rays and a CT scan
revealed no acute fracture. His injury was
diagnosed as a musculotendinous strain.
Zimmerman applied for disability benefits
on February 5, 1987 and received temporary
total disability benefits from January 30, 1987
to March 4, 1987. On approximately March 1,
1987, Zimmerman returned to work. While
lifting a heavy piece of meat at work, he
experienced a recurrence of back pain. He
remained off work for another period of time
and was again paid temporary total compensation from March 11, 1987 through April 29,
1987. His benefits were terminated, however,
when he failed to keep two doctor appointments. Compensation was reinstated on May 27,
1987 and he was paid through June 25, 1987,
when his benefits were again suspended for
failure to keep a physical therapy appointment.
Following further therapy, on approximately
July 1, 1987, Zimmerman began working for a
new employer, Wescot Fiberglass Company.
After working approximately one month with
Wescot, Zimmerman was injured while grinding dowit the edges of a large fiberglass
container. The boards on which he was sitting
gave way and he rolled off, landing on his
back. He experienced shooting sensations and
pain in his lower back and quit work because
of pain. He did not file a claim in connection
with this accident. Additional temporary total
disability benefits, however, were paid by the
Workers' Compensation Fund from September 9,1987 through January 29,1988.
On January 6, 1988, a hearing was conducted before an administrative law judge
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APPENDIX B

A G R E E M E N T

THIS AGREEMENT, made on the _A?ff day of

CL^r^^Jtr

, 1979,

by and between REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, I N C , a corporation, identified as the Company, herein referred to as "Company", and ROLAND W.
REICHERT, identified as the Company's sales representative, herein
referred to as "Agent", shall be as follows:
A.

The Company is the representative of certain

factories, manufacturers, and other principals engaged in
selling certain of their products.

The purpose of this

agreement is to develop and sustain a satisfactory volume of
sales of Company's products in the territory assigned to Agent.
B.

Company authorizes Agent to sell those products

handled by Company (hereinafter referred to as "Products") for
those principals of the Company included in the list of
principals contained in paragraph F below, and any additional
principals which it may represent during the term of this agreement.

These Products are to be sold at prices and terms cur-

rently in effect and from quotations set forth in Company's
approved price lists and schedules.
C.

Agent shall adhere to, cooperate and comply with

Company's sales policies and programs.
D.

Company grants Agent the exclusive privilege to

sell the Products to all purchasers (unless excluded by
mutual agreement in writing!, except Skaggs Companies, Inc.
and its successors in the case of a merger, in the territory of Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and Nevada.

The Skaggs

Companies, Inc. exception shall be for a forty-month period,
only, commencing on the 1st day of September, 1979.
Commissions shall be computed on the net amount of
the invoice after deducting discounts, allowances, trans-

supplies of advertising literature, samples and displays, to
encourage and facilitate the saie of Company's Products.
J,

Agent's employment shall be for an eight-year and

four-month period, commencing on September 1, 1979.

Either

party may, at its or his election, terminate Agent's employment for any reason.
K.

Agent is retained and Employed by Company only for

the purposes and to the extent set forth in this agreement, and
his relation to Company shall dtiring the period or periods of
his employment and services hereunder, be that of an independent contractor.

He shall be free to dispose of such por-

tion of his entire time, energy, and skill durincr regular business hours as he is not obligated to devote hereunder to Company
in such manner as he sees fit and to such persons, firms, or
corporations as he deems advisable, within the limitations contained herein.

Agent shall not be considered under the pro-

visions of this agreement or otherwise as having an employee cr
partner's status.
L.

At no time during the term of this agreement, or

within a period of three years immediately following the
termination of Agent's employment shall Agent, for himself or
in behalf of any other person, firm, partnership or corporation
(other than Company) represent any principal of Company for the
purpose of selling any of the Products; nor will he with respect
to the Products in any way, directly or indirectly, for himself
or in behalf of any other person, firm, partnership or corporation (other than Company) solicit, divert, or take away any
principal of Company during the term of this agreement or for
three years following the termination of Agent's employment.
Agent shall not during said period, with respect to the Products, or any other products similar to the Products, directly
or indirectly, for himself or in behalf of any other person,
firm, partnership or corporation (other than Company) sell to,
divert, take away, solicit, or attempt to solicit, business or

paid to Company upon demand by

Company.

Agent further agrees to pay Company its reasonable
attorney's fees and costs which are incurred as a result of
his breach of any provision herein.
Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting Company
from pursuing any other remedies available to it for such
breach or threatened breach, including the recovery of damages
from Agent.
M.

The waiver by Company of a breach of any provision

of this agreement by Agent shall not operate or be construed as
a waiver of any subsequent breach by Agent.
N.

The rights and obligations of Company under this

agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding
upon its successors and assigns.
0.

The rights of Agent under this agreement shall not

be assigned to any person or business entity without the prior
written consent of Company.

Agent recognizes that his personal

involvement in the business of Company is an important part of
the consideration for this agreement and therefore that any
failure by Company to consent to any proposed assignment shall
not constitute a breach of the agreement by Company.
P.

The obligations of Agent under this agreement shall

be binding upon his successors, assigns, heirs, and personal
representatives.
Q.

This instrument contains the entire agreement of

the parties.

It may not be changed orally but only by an

agreement in writing signed by the parties.
R.

This agreement shall be governed by and construed

according to the laws of the State of Utah.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the p a r t i e s have executed t h i s a g r e e ment in duplicate t h i s A ? ^ d a y of

(2t£f/£<££'

r 1979.

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC.
Its President

'

~\
/

